Branches, Subsidiaries and Foreign Bank Insolvency by Gatto, Josepho D.
Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 7 (1985) 173-196 173
North-Holland
BRANCHES, SUBSIDIARIES AND FOREIGN BANK INSOLVENCY
Joseph D. GATTO *
1. Introduction
On March 28, 1980, the central bank of Argentina revoked the authoriza-
tion of Banco de Intercambio Regional (Intercambio), an Argentine banking
corporation with a branch in New York, to operate as a commercial bank
within and outside Argentina and directed that the bank be liquidated under
the provisions of Argentine law. On the same day, the New York State
Superintendent of Banks took possession of Intercambio's New York branch
on the grounds that Intercambio was in liquidation in Argentina [1]. Deposi-
tors of the New York branch at first feared that they would not be able to
recover on their claims against the bank. Ultimately, the New York State Bank
Examiner found that the branch was solvent, with assets of approximately
$19.9 million and liabilities of $5.2 million [2]. Under these circumstances, the
Superintendent of Banks was able to pay in full all depositors of the New York
branch [3].
Notwithstanding this satisfactory outcome, the Intercambio liquidation
underscored the complicated regulatory and supervisory [4] issues associated
with banks [5] operating outside their home countries. To what extent, for
example, should the bank's home country be responsible for the supervision
and solvency of the bank's foreign operations? In the Intercambio incident, the
Argentine central bank was unwilling to provide financial assistance to Inter-
cambio's troubled international operations [6]. If assistance from the home
country is not guaranteed, how should the bank regulations of a host country
be modified to assure the safety and soundness of the host's [7] banking
system? In the case of a country with a dual banking system [8], such as the
United States, what division of regulatory functions among the various federal
and state authorities will promote safety and soundness without unnecessarily
sacrificing the economic efficiency of the system?
This article examines these issues in the context of the United States' bank
regulatory system. Section 2 sets out the nature and extent of the expanding
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foreign banking presence in the United States. Section 3 briefly reviews the
U.S. bank regulatory scheme, the restrictions on interstate expansion, and the
treatment of a foreign bank's U.S. branches under the International Banking
Act of 1978 [9]. Section 4 highlights the shortcomings in the existing proce-
dures for liquidating or rehabilitating a U.S. branch or subsidiary of a failing
foreign bank. Preventative measures taken by the U.S. bank regulators will also
be discussed in this section. Section 5 explores proposals for coordinating the
regulatory efforts of the host and home countries. Several suggestions for
improving these schemes are put forth. Section 6 is a brief conclusion.
2. Growth of foreign banks in the United States
Foreign banks' activities in the United States have grown dramatically since
the mid-1970s. At the end of 1973 there were approximately sixty foreign
banks operating U.S. banking offices [10] with combined assets of $32 billion
[11]. By June 30, 1984, there were 242 foreign banks operating 528 offices in
the United States with combined assets of $340 billion [12].
Foreign banks establish U.S. offices for a number of reasons: to service
their corporate clients that expand operations in the United States and other
countries, to gain access to U.S. money markets and stabilize their source of
dollar funds, to grow in an economically sound and politically safe market,
and to compete for the domestic banking business of U.S. corporations [13].
Most foreign branches in the United States operate solely in the wholesale [14]
banking area [15]. Recently, however, a small number of foreign banks have
expanded from wholesale banking to retail banking with individuals who are in
some way affiliated with the bank's home country [16]. The foreign banks'
emphasis on wholesale banking has created a high concentration of these
banks in New York, California, Illinois, and Florida [17].
The foreign banks operating in the United States are generally headquartered
in the major industrial countries. Approximately seventy percent of the assets
are held and over thirty-five percent of the offices are operated by banks from
four countries: the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and France [18].
The self-restriction of foreign banks' U.S. operations to the wholesale
market and the dominance of banks from economically stable countries have
significantly reduced the probability that small depositors will face the in-
solvency of their foreign bank. These limits have also reduced the chance that a
foreign bank failure will seriously disrupt the U.S. banking system. However,
the recent influx of banks from less developed countries and the trend toward
retail banking activities are increasing the risk that the U.S. banking system
and U.S. depositors will face the insolvency of a foreign bank.
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3. Banking in the United States
3.1. The dual banking system
The banking system in the United States is regulated by both state and
federal authorities. Under this "dual banking system," commercial banks can
choose to be regulated either under a state scheme, a federal scheme, or both.
The scope and intensity of regulation depends on which category a bank falls
into [19]. A bank can choose the regulatory framework in which it will operate.
More importantly, an existing bank can change its regulatory framework [201.
3.1.1. Federal supervision
Federal banking law is administered by three agencies: the Comptroller of
Currency (Comptroller) [211, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRB) [221, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
[23]. The Comptroller is the chartering authority for national banks and has
the power to supervise and examine national banks [24]. The Federal Reserve
is the country's central bank and is responsible for shaping and controlling
monetary policy [25]. National banks must belong to the Federal Reserve
System [26]; state banks may elect to join the system [27]. Reserve System
member banks (member banks) must comply with FRB regulations regarding
such matters as the adequacy of capital, mergers, and the establishment of
branches [28]. In return, member banks may, for example, borrow from the
Federal Reserve Banks when it. is necessary to obtain additional currency [29].
The FDIC was created to restore and maintain public confidence in the
banking system after the disastrous bank failures of the 1930s by insuring the
deposits of participating banks [30]. Each depositor in an insured bank [31] is
protected by federal deposit insurance up to the current limit of $100 000 [32].
The federal deposit insurance scheme is effective because the FDIC both
insures against failure and enforces sound practice so as to reduce the number
and degree of bank failures [33]. Banks admitted to the insured group must
satisfy a minimum standard of quality [34]. After admission, insured banks are
subject to continuing supervision by the FDIC. If the FDIC finds that a bank
has not complied with the FDIC's reporting requirements, or has engaged in
unsafe and unsound practices, or is in an unsafe or unsound condition, then
the FDIC may terminate the insured bank's status as an insured bank [35].
Because FDIC insurance is mandatory for national banks and highly desirable
for most state banks, the threat of termination gives the FDIC extraordinary
influence over the insured banks' operations. The insurance scheme is effective
only because the FDIC can control the risk against which it must insure [36].
3.1.2. State regulation and supervision
While there is no uniform state regulatory structure, a number of issues are
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usually addressed. Thus, minimum capital, reserve requirements, limitations on
types and amounts of loans or investments, permissible interest rates, and
establishment of branches are regulated in most states [37]. Supervisory power
is lodged in a state superintendent of banking, who oversees the state's banking
department [381. Because most state banks are FDIC-insured, the state bank-
ing authorities share responsibility for certain regulatory functions with the
FDIC.
3.2. Legislation affecting foreign banks' operations
A number of federal laws affect foreign bank operations in the United
States: the McFadden Act of 1927 [39], the Douglas Amendment to the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, [40] and the International Banking Act of 1978
[411. A brief review of the McFadden Act and the Douglas Amendment is a
necessary prelude to the discussion of the International Banking Act.
3.2.1. McFadden Act and Douglas Amendment
The McFadden Act was intended to place national and state banks on an
equal basis with regard to branch banking [42]. The Act, as amended, allows
the national banks in a state to establish branches to the same extent that the
state permits state banks to branch [431. Moreover, national banks may branch
only if the state explicitly permits such branching [441. Because state banking
statutes generally do not authorize branching outside the state, the McFadden
Act effectively limits national banks to intrastate branching.
The Douglas Amendment ensures that national banks do not use the bank
holding company [45] form of organization to avoid the McFadden Act's
restrictions [46]. The Amendment prohibits a bank holding company from
acquiring a bank outside its home state unless the other state explicitly permits
such acquisition [471. Although its overseas affiliates will not qualify a foreign
bank as a bank holding company, the acquisition or establishment of a single
U.S. commercial bank will make the foreign bank a bank holding company
[48]. Therefore, a foreign bank may not, in general, acquire or establish bank
subsidiaries in two different states.
3.2.2. International Banking Act of 1978
The International Banking Act (IBA) was enacted to provide federal regu-
lation [49] and supervision [50] of foreign banks' operations in the United
States and to establish to the fullest extent possible "equal treatment" for
foreign and domestic banks in the United States [51].
Section 4 of the IBA makes the dual regulatory system applicable to
branches and agencies of foreign banks. Subject to the approval of the
Comptroller of the Currency, [52], a foreign bank may establish a federal
branch or agency in any state where the bank does not already operate a
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state-licensed branch or agency, and in which the establishment of a branch or
agency is not prohibited by state law [53]. This section offers foreign banks a
state-federal option in those states that permit federal offices. Furthermore,
foreign banks have the option to convert state branches or agencies into federal
branches or agencies [54].
Section 4(b) provides that the operations of a federal branch or agency of a
foreign bank are to be conducted with the same duties, restrictions, penalties,
liabilities, conditions, and limitations that would apply to a national bank
doing business at the same location [551. While section 4(b) embodies the
concept of equal treatment, foreign banks do suffer certain restrictions and
limitations designed to protect the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking
system. Because branches and agencies are operationally and legally offices of
foreign banks, not separate incorporated entities, section 4 provides that
limitations or restrictions based on the capital stock and surplus of a national
bank are deemed to refer to the assets of the foreign bank [56], and that
branches and agencies must satisfy through a deposit arrangement the capital
equivalency and asset maintenance requirements imposed by the Comptroller
[57].
Sections 6, 7, 11, and 13 of the IBA complete the framework for the
reguldtion, examination, and supervision of foreign banks' activities in the
United States. Under section 6, all federal and state branches of foreign banks
may seek FDIC insurance of their domestic deposits [58]. Insurance is manda-
tory for branches that accept retail deposits [59]. An insured branch is subject
to asset maintenance and capital equivalency ledger account requirements [60]
and to country exposure limits [61]. Branches accepting only wholesale de-
posits need not obtain insurance; depositors at these branches must rely on the
remaining regulatory and supervisory scheme [62]. Under section 7, the FRB
has authority to establish reserve requirements for federal and state branches
and agencies [63]. In order to ensure adequate supervision of foreign bank
operations under the dual regulatory system, section 13 provides that the
Comptroller, the FDIC, and the states have primary examining authority over
operations within their jurisdiction [64]. Thus, federal branches and agencies
are subject to examination by the Comptroller; insured state branches are
examined by state authorities and the FDIC; noninsured state branches and all
state agencies are examined by the state or, if not so examined, by the Federal
Reserve [65].
The IBA was a move toward equal treatment of foreign and domestic banks.
There is some evidence that the states have responded in kind [66]. Prior to
enactment of the IBA a number of states had imposed stringent asset mainte-
nance requirements to protect depositors, other creditors, and the general
public from the insolvency of foreign banks operating in their state. New York,
California, and Illinois, for example, required a foreign bank's branch to hold
liquid assets [67] equal to 108% of its aggregate liabilities [68] within the state
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[69]. After enactment of the IBA, the Comptroller did not impose an asset
maintenance requirement on federal branches. In response, New York, Cali-
fornia, and Illinois amended their asset maintenance statutes to give the state
banking authority discretion in establishing asset maintenance requirements
[70]. These authorities have largely eschewed establishing these requirements
and, for example, the New York Superintendent generally imposes no asset
maintenance requirement [71].
The IBA attempts to place U.S. and foreign banks' operations on equal
footing, with certain exceptions to protect the U.S. banking system and U.S.
depositors. In the next section the article considers how the U.S. authorities
handle the insolvency of a foreign bank.
4. Insolvency and foreign banks with U.S. offices or subsidiaries
4.1. Insolvency of a majority-owned subsidiary
Because U.S. law treats subsidiaries as distinct legal entities, a parent
company bank has a significant opportunity to escape liability for the obliga-
tions of its insolvent subsidiary banks [72]. Although the failure of only the
majority-owned subsidiary appears unlikely at present [73], the simultaneous
insolvency of a foreign parent and its U.S. subsidiary [74] would create the
anomalous situation of depositors and other creditors of the subsidiary in one
state having claims only against the subsidiary while similar depositors and
creditors at the parent's branch in another state would have claims against the
U.S. branch and the home office [75]. This potential anomaly has prompted
various commentators to propose the elimination of the branch/subsidiary
distinction in the insolvency area [76].
One method by which dissatisfied creditors of the subsidiary could claim
against the parent would be to invoke the common law doctrine of "piercing
the corporate veil." This doctrine holds the entity controlling the corporation
liable for the corporation's obligations if the controlling entity has so ignored
the separate existence of the corporation that it would be inequitable to
consider the corporation a distinct entity [77]. The foreign parent would be
held liable for the subsidiary's obligations. Piercing the veil would appear to be
difficult in the banking context, however, because courts are reluctant to
disregard the corporate form unless the misconduct rises to the level of fraud,
crime, or evasion of existing obligations [78]. Mere use of the parent bank's
name by the subsidiary would probably not constitute fraud, although the
subsidiary's affirmative identification of the subsidiary with the parent so as to
mislead depositors could be fraud. While the U.S. banking authorities cannot
totally prevent fraud by the parent, the constant monitoring by the Federal
Reserve [79] makes it less likely that fraud could occur over an extended period
of time.
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4.2. Insolvency of foreign banks with U.S. branches
Many foreign banks have established branches in the United States. Regard-
less of how well the branch is regulated and supervised, the failure of the
"parent" bank [80] will cause the branch to fail as well [81]. A proper
understanding of the possible effects of a foreign bank's insolvency requires an
examination of the procedures for dealing with insolvency under each of the
available regulatory schemes.
4.2.1. Noninsured federal branch
A federal branch of a foreign bank need not obtain FDIC insurance if the
branch does not receive retail deposits or if the Comptroller determines by
order or regulation that the branch is not engaged in domestic retail deposit
activities requiring deposit insurance protection [82]. This exemption recog-
nizes the tradeoff between the costs of FDIC insurance and the need to protect
the interests of small depositors. Presumably, large depositors are better able to
assess the risks of doing business with a noninsured bank and to negotiate a
deposit agreement that reallocates that risk [83]. In addition, the large deposi-
tor may bargain to receive some of the branch's cost savings from nonin-
surance.
Whenever the Comptroller revokes a foreign bank's authority to operate a
federal branch [84], or the Comptroller becomes satisfied that the foreign bank
is insolvent, or a creditor with a judgment arising out of a transaction with the
federal branch has been unpaid for thirty days, the Comptroller may appoint a
receiver who will take possession of all the property and assets of the foreign
bank in the United States, including the assets of state-licensed branches and
agencies, and exercise the same rights, privileges, powers, and authority as
would a receiver of a national bank appointed by the Comptroller [851.
A national bank's receiver stands in the place of the bank he represents [86];
he takes title to the bank's assets and property subject to all equities which
existed against the assets in the hands of the bank [87]. The receiver is charged
with the collection and conservation of the bank's assets for the benefit of
creditors [88]. He is not limited to just what is sufficient to pay off liabilities
but may collect all debts due [89]. The receiver pays over all money collected to
the Treasurer of the United States, subject to order of the Comptroller [90].
The Comptroller, in turn, satisfies pro rata all proven or adjudicated claims
[91]. If all claims are satisfied, the remaining assets are paid to the bank's
shareholders [92].
The IBA modifies the usual distribution scheme by requiring that depositors
and creditors whose claims arose out of their transactions with any branch or
agency of the foreign bank located in the United States be satisfied in full
before the Comptroller turns over the remaining assets to the bank's head
office or duly appointed domiciliary receiver for distribution to the other
creditors [93].
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The receiver will not, however, be able to attach property located outside
the United States. To the extent that these assets may be needed to satisfy the
depositors' claims, the depositors of the branch may be only partially satisfied.
To obtain a larger recovery, the depositor will have to claim against the bank
in its home country, unless the home country's central bank decides to ensure
that depositors of the insolvent bank's foreign branches are paid in full [94].
4.2.2. Insured federal branch
A federal branch of a foreign bank that receives retail deposits must obtain
FDIC insurance unless the Comptroller determines that the deposit-taking
activities at the branch do not require insurance protection [95]. As with a
noninsured branch [96], the Comptroller may appoint a receiver of an insured
federal branch if he is satisfied that the parent bank is insolvent, if the branch's
authority to operate is revoked, or if a judgment creditor remains unpaid for
thirty days [97]. The Comptroller may, but is not required to, appoint the
FDIC as receiver [98]. If the receiver finds that the branch has assets sufficient
to satisfy the demands of depositors and creditors with claims arising out of
transactions with the bank's U.S. branches, then those claimants will be paid in
full. If, however, the branch's assets are insufficient, then the branch will be
deemed closed and unable to meet the demands of depositors [991.
The FDIC can protect depositors of failed or failing banks in two ways.
With the first technique, called the payoff or payout method, the FDIC pays
insured depositors to the extent of the insurance coverage [100]. The payment
may be in cash or by making available to each depositor a transferred deposit
in a new bank [101] or in an insured bank in the full amount insured [102]. In a
payoff transaction, the FDIC is subrogated to the depositors' claims against
the closed branch to the extent of the payment [103].
With the second technique, known as an assumption or a purchase and
assumption transaction, the FDIC arranges for another insured bank to
purchase the assets and assume the liabilities of the distressed bank [104]. In
order to make the assumption attractive, the FDIC will exercise its power to
purchase assets and assume liabilities of the distressed institution, make loans
to the acquiring bank, and guarantee the acquiring bank against losses in-
curred by reason of the assumption [105]. The advantage of the assumption
transaction is the greater level of protection afforded individual depositors
[106]. In an assumption transaction, all depositors receive full protection
because the consolidated bank assumes all depositors' liabilities- the matter of
the insurance ceiling is not relevant.
Although the FDIC has no experience with liquidating a foreign insured
branch, it is likely that the FDIC would employ the payoff method [107]. The
primary reason for not using the assumption technique is that few banks would
be willing to assume the risks of contingent liabilities (including unrecorded
accounts, deposits made outside the United States but designated for the U.S.
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branch, and potential liabilities for actions by agents of the branch) without a
guarantee against loss by the home country's central bank [108]. The assuming
bank would likely attempt to shift such risks by seeking a letter of compensa-
tion from the FDIC. The FDIC, however, believes such a guarantee would
pose an unacceptable risk to the deposit insurance fund [1091.
Hence, if there are insufficient assets located in the United States to cover
uninsured domestic creditors' claims, both these creditors and the FDIC will
have to join the group of creditors seeking payment in the home country.
4.2.3. Insured state branch
State branches accepting retail deposits must obtain FDIC insurance, unless
the FDIC determines that the deposit activities do not require insurance or the
state does not require state banks to obtain insurance [110]. Although a state
branch's status as an insured branch usually leads the state banking authorities
to appoint the FDIC as receiver when a receiver is appointed [111], the
branch's insured status does not significantly affect the analysis because the
FDIC must follow state law when acting as receiver of a state banking
institution [112]. The FDIC exercises the rights, powers, and privileges granted
by state law to a receiver of a state bank [113].
4.2.4. Noninsured state branch
Although relatively few states permit foreign banks to establish branches
[114], New York [115], Illinois [116], and California [117]- the major financial
center states- do allow such branching. Furthermore, two other states have
recently permitted foreign banks to branch [118]. Although the procedures for
liquidating or rehabilitating a distressed bank differ in detail from state to
state, the same general rules apply in New York, California, and Illinois. This
article will focus on these three states because eighty-eight percent of all
foreign bank branches are located in these states. [119].
The state superintendent of banking (superintendent) is authorized to take
possession and control of the branch's business and assets in the state [120] if
he finds that the branch (1) has violated the law, (2) is conducting its business
in an unsound manner, (3) is in an unsound or unsafe condition, (4) has ceased
operations, (5) is insolvent or has impaired its capital, or (6) has had a receiver
or similar person appointed for the bank in the jurisdiction in which the parent
is domiciled [121]. After taking possession of the bank the superintendent may
liquidate or reorganize the bank [122]. While liquidating or reorganizing, the
superintendent is empowered to collect, use, and sell the bank's assets, to
collect debts due, to compromise claims, to execute instruments, and to pursue
and defend actions in the bank's name [123]. The superintendent, or the
receiver appointed by him, shall pay pro rata creditors with proven claims.
New York grants a preference to creditors with claims arising out of transac-
tions with the New York branch [124]. California gives priority to California
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creditors to the extent of the bank's business in the state [125]. Illinois grants
no preferences. After all creditors and the expenses of liquidation have been
paid, the superintendent turns over the remaining assets to the head office or
the receiver in the home country [126].
The various state schemes, in effect, treat the state branch of an insolvent
foreign bank as a separate entity. This treatment is manifested by the priority
given to claims of the branch's creditors and by the superintendent's power to
marshall the branch's assets.
The broad grant of authority to the superintendent may create conflicts with
receivers or liquidators in other jurisdictions. If the branch is treated as a
separate entity in a liquidation proceeding, then two liquidators may be
competing for the same assets. For example, the California superintendent may
take possession of the property and business of the parent bank if the parent is
put into liquidation in its own country [127]. The New York superintendent
may collect all the assets of the New York branch, wherever situated [128]. It is
not inconceivable that a large foreign bank with operations in New York and
California may book assets located in California with the New York branch.
Such assets would be claimed by both the New York and California super-
intendents.
A simple solution would be to consolidate the liquidation proceedings, with
a pooling of assets and equal treatment of claims filed in either proceeding.
This solution is sensible to the extent that the branches are legally parts of the
same entity. A single, neutral receiver could be appointed in place of the New
York and California superintendents; after pooling, the claims of all creditors
would be paid ratably.
However, there are two problems with consolidation: (1) some states require
preferential treatment of creditors of the in-state branch in order to protect the
interests of the state's citizens [129], and (2) if the branch liquidations are
consolidated, a further argument may be made that there should be only one
proceeding, to be located in the home country. A sole receiver would marshall
the assets of the parent bank and its branches, and perhaps, the subsidiaries.
All claims could be satisfied pro rata. This, however, would put U.S. deposi-
tors at the mercy of a potentially hostile foreign receiver.
5. Cooperation among bank regulatory authorities
The simplicity and efficiency of a consolidated proceeding for a distressed
multinational bank make the concept of consolidation very appealing. The
United States would probably oppose consolidation, however, on several
grounds. First, the host is concerned that the home country's central bank will
not arrange a satisfactory solution for the distressed bank. In the Intercambio
incident, for example, there was tremendous concern that the central bank of
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Argentina would not resolve Intercambio's affairs in a satisfactory way [130].
Second, the host's bank regulatory officials are concerned that creditors of a
host branch would not receive fair treatment by the liquidators and legal
tribunals in the home country. To return to the Intercambio incident, one U.S.
congressman noted that Argentine banking authorities would be more con-
cerned with protecting Argentine depositors than New York depositors [131].
Finally, banks in other nations often differ from U.S. banks in significant
ways. In many nations, there is no division between commercial and invest-
ment banking activities [1321. Furthermore, banks often engage in nonfinancial
operations [133]. If such a bank becomes insolvent, its liquidation will leave a
myriad of creditors competing with depositors for assets with speculative or
little value. In addition, foreign banks based in weakly regulated financial
centers are not subject to the scrutiny of meticulous bank examiners nor to
strict accounting standards [134]. The resulting record-keeping laxity may
prevent even the identification of the bank's assets and liabilities. These
problems can be exacerbated by changes in national governments and massive
dismissals and appointments of bank regulators. Absent an agreement among
nations and their central banks on acceptable methods for marshalling and
distributing the assets of a failed multinational bank, each country that allows
entry of foreign bank branches has an interest in treating the branch as a
separate entity and imposing various precautionary requirements such as
maintenance of assets within the jurisdiction. Of course, such requirements and
separate treatment involve certain costs and impair, to at least some extent, the
efficient international flow of capital. The inefficiencies and costs of unequal
treatment and special requirements may be an acceptable tradeoff for protec-
tion of the host's banking system and depositors. The United States, for one,
follows this policy.
Host countries will be more willing to equalize regulation of a foreign
bank's branches if the home country's bank regulatory structure is sound and
its supervisory authorities are diligent. Fortunately, banking practices in the
major industrial countries are generally sound. Such practices reduce the
likelihood that a host country's banking system and depositors will face the
insolvency of their branch because of the parent bank's failure. Unfortunately,
no bank regulatory scheme can guarantee that no bank will fail. Supervisory
improvements by individual nations cannot take the place of an internationally
coordinated bank regulatory system.
A major step toward an international system was taken when the Commit-
tee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices was formed to coordi-
nate supervision of international banking activities. The Committee comprises
the central bank governors from the Group of Ten Countries [135] and
Switzerland. The Committee's general statement, known as the Basle Con-
cordat, was approved in 1975 [136] and revised in 1983 [137]. The 1975
Concordat established certain fundamental principles: (1) supervision of for-
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eign banking establishments is the joint responsibility of the home and host
countries, (2) no foreign banking establishment should be unsupervised, (3)
practical cooperation should be provided by exchanges of information between
host and home banking authorities, and (4) supervisory responsibility for
liquidity and solvency should be allocated between the host and home authori-
ties [138].
The 1983 revisions addressed the adequacy of supervision and the need for
supervision of the bank as a consolidated entity. The Concordat provides for
adequate supervision by encouraging a host authority that considers the parent
bank's supervision to be inadequate to prohibit or discourage the continued
operation of the foreign bank in its jurisdiction or to impose specific condi-
tions on the bank's operations [139]. Similarly, a home country that considers
the host authority's supervision to be inadequate should extend its own
supervision or bar the parent from continued operation abroad [140]. These
provisions attempt to reverse the usual tendency for banks to seek weakly
regulated jurisdictions [141].
The revised Concordat also encourages supervision of the bank as a
consolidated entity. Thus, a foreign subsidiary's solvency is the joint responsi-
bility of the home and host countries - the host country because the subsidiary
is host-chartered, the home country because the subsidiary is part of a
multinational banking organization overseen by the home supervisor [142].
Solvency of a branch is the responsibility of the home country because the
branch's solvency is considered identical to the parent bank's [143]. Liquidity
of both the branch and the subsidiary, on the other hand, is the sole
responsibility of the host country, which is presumed to be more familiar with
local banking conditions [144].
The Concordat is a first step toward international bank supervision, but it is
only a first step. To be fully effective, the principles set forth in the Concordat
need to be endorsed by bank supervisors worldwide [145]. Universal accep-
tance of the Concordat is unlikely to occur soon, however, given the great
variations in bank regulatory and supervisory schemes in the developing
countries.
Even if the Concordat were widely accepted, the agreement is directed only
toward the supervision of ongoing banking organizations. The failure to agree
on the principles and procedures for handling a distressed banking institution
is a major gap in the international regulatory structure. A truly comprehensive
agreement would address the issues of emergency support (sometimes referred
to as the lender of last resort problem), liquidation, and deposit insurance. The
Concordat specifically avoids the lender of last resort issue [146]. Although at
least one central banker has argued that rules and procedures for temporarily
ensuring liquidity would undermine market discipline [147], it is difficult to
justify a general regulatory scheme that does not provide for emergency
assistance to a distressed banking institution.
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The inability to prescribe generally accepted procedures for liquidating or
rehabilitating a failed bank is also a serious problem. A worldwide consoli-
dated liquidation proceeding is, perhaps, the goal [148], but the great variety of
liquidation procedures and the possibility that creditors in the home country
would benefit at the expense of the host countries' depositors still prevent
consolidated liquidations. Deposit insurance is less of a problem. If each
nation were assured that sound banking practices were being followed in all
other nations, then each nation could insure its depositors by assessing the
branch or subsidiary an insurance premium. The assessment would, of course,
be determined by international agreement.
The Concordat's failure to address the problem of distressed banks and the
lack of worldwide consensus about the concepts espoused in the Concordat
make it clear that bank regulatory officials cannot rely on the Concordat to
resolve the issues that would arise in the event of a multinational bank's
failure. At best, there may be tacit understandings among various central
banks regarding ultimate liability to creditors of a failed multinational bank.
Under these uncertain circumstances depositors of foreign bank branches
and subsidiaries will look to the parent bank (if it is solvent) [1491, the home
country's central bank [150], and the host's deposit insurance scheme [151].
The host country's banking system and bank regulators will expect interven-
tion by the parent bank [152] (if it is solvent) and the home country's central
bank.
The existing patchwork of regulatory and supervisorty responsibility often
obscures the real issues of promoting good banking practice and protecting
national and international banking systems and depositors from the harmful
effects of bank failures. One commentator suggests that the current confusion
arises from the conflict of three regulatory principles: (1) national autonomy in
regulatory matters, which permits wide variations among national regulators;
(2) neutrality, which advocates regulatory parity between the foreign and
domestic banks operating in the same country; and (3) parental responsibility,
which asserts that the parent bank is responsible for its foreign operations
[1531.
Modification of any one of these principles would greatly simplify the
present regulatory problem. Reversing the principle of parental responsibility,
for example, would prevent the trinsfer of risk and liability from the parent to
the foreign operation or vice versa. This would be accomplished by confining
foreign operations to the subsidiary form and limiting financial dealings
between parent and subsidiary. Rigorous supervisory measures would be
necessary to enforce this separation, which has the effect of placing the
regulatory and supervisory burden on the host country. Under this arrange-
ment, depositors of the subsidiary would look to the host authorities for
preventive and emergency protection.
An alternative approach would repudiate the neutrality principle. Although
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this approach would require the United States to abandon the policy of the
International Banking Act, the elimination of national treatment would permit
domestic regulators to develop special regulations to protect depositors of the
foreign bank's domestic operations. At present, careful screening and special
capital requirements have been the primary mechanisms on which U.S. regu-
lators have relied. Other more stringent possibilities would include extending
deposit insurance to all deposits held in foreign banks and requiring the bank
to pay additional premiums, and/or imposing an asset maintenance require-
ment on foreign branches.
Increasing deposit insurance may be worthwhile to the extent that the FDIC
will not effect purchase and assumption transactions for insolvent foreign bank
branches. It is not clear, however, whether the benefits of additional insurance
will outweigh the attendant costs because foreign branches still engage prim-
arily in the wholesale business. The large customers of these branches simply
may not need insurance.
In effect, the deposit insurance issue illustrates the problem involved with
abandoning national treatment: there is an adverse competitive effect if banks
must conduct business on unequal terms within the same jurisdiction. Never-
theless, if foreign banks continue to operate branches and if there is no
international agreement among central banks regarding preventive regulation
and emergency arrangements for multinational banks, then national regulatory
officials must continue to take special precautions with foreign banks in order
to protect domestic creditors.
The most appealing approach to reform would require nations to relinquish
some of their sovereignty. A binding international agreement among bank
regulators of all nations regarding supervisory responsibilities, lender of last
resort obligations, and liquidation proceedings, would remove the need for
inefficient regulatory restrictions imposed by the host countries on foreign
banking operations. It could resolve the problem depositors and other creditors
face in deciding where to raise their claims, and the problems associated with
receivers from different jurisdictions trying to take title to the same assets.
One of the major difficulties with this solution would, of course, be securing
agreement of all the countries that have financial centers. If an agreement
among a majority of these nations could be reached, however, participation of
the remaining nations could probably be arranged if the majority refused to
host banks headquartered in nonparticipating countries and prohibited their
own banks from establishing offices in such jurisdictions.
6. Conclusion
Foreign banking in the United States has increased dramatically in the past
decade. The United States has responded to this influx of foreign bank offices
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by attempting to place foreign and domestic banks on equal footing and by
ensuring federal regulation and supervision of these offices. Foreign bank
branches are regulated somewhat differently, however, because the branches
are legally and operationally extensions of the home office. But because the
U.S. banking authorities, particularly the FDIC, cannot adequately protect
against the harmful effects of bank failure unless the banks are properly
regulated on a consolidated basis, there is a danger that banks from a weakly
regulated jurisdiction or a politically or economically unstable country could
fail -injuring the U.S. banking system and U.S. depositors.
This danger could be reduced or eliminated if the significant banking
nations agreed to a uniform regulatory and supervisory scheme and allocated
responsibility for assisting or liquidating distressed banks. Absent such cooper-
ation, all nations, and the United States in particular, will be forced to impose
special regulations on foreign banks in order to protect their own depositors
and banking system. Such regulation impedes the efficient flow of interna-
tional capital at a time when the world cannot afford to waste this resource.
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Notes
[1] See Connolly v. Williams Real Estate Co., 80 A.D. 2d 109, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1981). This
action is authorized by N.Y. Banking Law § 606(4)(a) (McKinney 1971).
[2] Seattle First National Bank v. Banco de Intercambio Regional, Settle Order at 4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. June 25, 1980).
[3] Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Banks and the Nonbanking Activities of Foreign Bank Holding
Companies: Hearings before Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of House
Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1980) (statement of Muriel Siebert,
Superintendent of Banks, State of New York) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
[4] For purposes of this article "regulation" will refer to the statutory and administrative rules
governing banking activities. Thus, regulation affects or prescribes the location of banks, bank
expansion, the services provided, the activities engaged in, the capital structure employed, and
similar matters. "Supervision" will refer to the activities of the various banking authorities which
monitor banks to promote good banking practices, rehabilitate failed or failing banks, and engage
in similar activities. "Examination" will refer to the periodic inspection of an individual bank's
records, loan portfolios, and practices to ensure compliance with the law.
[5] Identifying a "bank" is not always an easy task. In the United States a bank is "any
association organized to carry on the business of banking." 12 U.S.C. § 37 (1982). The powers a
bank may exercise are enumerated in 12 U.S.C. § 24. A commercial bank is defined as an
institution that accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
Commercial banks are subject to special regulation and supervision. A foreign bank is a company,
organized under the laws of another country or a territory of the United States, that "engages] in
banking activities usual in connection with the business of banking" in the country of organization.
12 U.S.C. § 3101(7) (1982).
[6] Hearings, supra note 3, at 31-32.
[7] This article refers to the host country as the nation in which a foreign bank conducts
operations. The home country is the nation that charters the parent bank.
[8] The dual banking system in the United States is discussed infra notes 19-38 and
accompanying text.
[9] Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified principally at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1982)).
[10] "Banking offices" comprise agencies, branches, and majority-owned subsidiary commercial
banks. Agencies and branches are extensions of the parent bank; subsidiaries are distinct legal
entities with their own capital stock. See White, Foreign Banking In the United States: A
Regulatory and Supervisory Perspective, 7 F.R.B. N.Y. Rev., Summer 1982, at 48, 49. A foreign
bank's subsidiary operates pursuant to a national or state charter from the host country; the
subsidiary is subject to the same restrictions and enjoys the same powers as other domestic banks
operating under the same chartering authority. While branches and subsidiaries are conceptually
different, both institutions may accept deposits, make loans, and engage in essentially the same
types of banking activities. Foreign bank agencies may not accept deposits from U.S. citizens or
residents. 12 U.S.C. § 3101(1) (1982). Agencies are not considered in this article because they
account for only 15% of the assets held by U.S. offices of foreign banks, see infra note 12, and
because their inability to accept deposits limits the harm their failure will inflict on their customers
or the banking system.
[11] Federal Reserve Board, Selected Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks,
May 1984 (copy on file with Journal of Comparative Business & Capital Market Law).
[12] Federal Reserve Board, Structure Data for U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks as of 06/30/84
(computer run on Dec. 12, 1984) (copy on file with Journal of Comparative Business and Capital
Market Law) [hereinafter cited as Structure Data].
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[13] White, supra note 10, at 51.
[141 Retail banking usually refers to the acceptance of bank deposits of less than S100,000. See,
e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3104 (1982) (deposit insurance must be obtained if bank accepts deposits of less
than S100,000 unless Comptroller of Currency determines deposits do not constitute retail deposit
activities). Wholesale banking refers to deposits equal to or greater than $100,000.
[15] White, supra note 10, at 51.
[16] See Hearings, supra note 3, at 31. The few foreign banks entering the U.S. retail market
usually have done so by acquiring a U.S. bank with an existing retail branch network in order to
avoid a large investment in plant, equipment, and personnel training. White, supra note 10, at 51.
[17] Federal Reserve Board, Foreign Investment in U.S. Banking Institutions, reprinted in Bank
Expansion Rep., Feb. 20, 1984, at 7. Most foreign bank operations in Florida are conducted
through agencies, id., which cannot accept deposits. 12 U.S.C. § 3101 (1) (1982). Because agencies
are outside the scope of this article, foreign bank operations in Florida will not be considered.
[18] See Structure Data, supra note 12.
[191 See Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 Va. L. Rev. 565, 565-66 (1966). This
footnote summarizes the banking system by type of bank. The text accompanying notes 21-32
summarizes the system by type of regulatory agency.
National banks, which are chartered under federal law, are automatically members of the
Federal Reserve System ("member banks") and their deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Most large banks fall into this category.
State member banks are state banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System and are
insured by the FDIC. Nonmember insured banks are state banks which do not join the Federal
Reserve System but nevertheless obtain deposit insurance. Most small banks fall into this category.
Finally, noninsured state banks are state banks which choose neither to join the Federal Reserve
System nor to obtain deposit insurance. These banks are regulated solely by state law. See
generally Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 Stan. L Rev. 1
(1977).
[20] A state chartered bank can withdraw from the Federal Reserve System or the FDIC. Scott,
supra note 19, at 8; Hackley, supra note 19, at 568.
National banks can convert to state banks so long as the state law allows conversion. 12 U.S.C.
§ 214c (1982). For examples of state statutes, see Cal. Fin. Code § 1091 (West Supp. 1984); I1.
Ann. Stat. ch. 17, § 332-333 (Smith-Hurd 1981); N.Y. Banking Law § 136 (McKinney 1971&Supp.
1984).
[21] See National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1-21 (1982)).
[22] See Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (codified principally in 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522
(1982)).
[23] Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15. and 39
U.S.C.).
[24] 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27 (1982); see also, Scott, In Quest of Reason: The Licensing Decisions of
the Federal Banking Agencies, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 235-38 (1975).
[25] See 1 W. Schlichting, T. Rice & J. Cooper, Banking Law § 2.04 [6] (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Banking Law]. Essentially all banks must maintain monetary reserves with the System's Federal
Reserve Banks. The FRB controls the money supply in part by adjusting the reserve requirements.
[26] 12 U.S.C. § 282 (1982).
[27] Id. §§ 321-324 (1982).
[28] See Banking Law, supra note 25, at § 2.94 [6].
[291 Id.
[30] K. Randall, The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: Regulation Functions and Philoso-
phy, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 696, 698 (1966).
[31] All national banks and state member banks must be insured by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. §
1814(b) (1982). State nonmember banks and state branches of foreign banks may apply for FDIC
insurance. Id § 1815(a), (b).
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[32] 12 C.F.R. § 330.2 (1984). Insurance is on the aggregate of all the investor's deposits made
in the same right and capacity. Cf. 12 C.F.R. §§ 330.0-330.12 (1984).
[33] See Note, Federal Insurance of Deposits, 36 Col. L. Rev. 809 (1936); Kress, The Banking
Act of 1935, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 155 (1935).
[34] Before approving a bank for deposit insurance, the FDIC considers, among other factors,
the financial history and condition of the bank, the adequacy of its capital structure, its future
earnings prospects, the general character of management, and the convenience and needs of the
community to be served by the bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1982). In considering the application of a
foreign bank's branch, the FDIC will also consider whether the information supplied and to be
supplied will be sufficiently adequate and reliable for the FDIC to carry out its duties. Id. §
1815(b) (7) (1982).
[35] 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a) (1982).
[36] Before national deposit insurance was introduced a number of states experimented with
deposit insurance. These schemes always failed - usually because the states admitted all banks,
however risky, to the insured group and because no steps were taken to improve banking practices
so as to reduce the risk of bank failures. See Note, supra note 33.
[37] See generally Comparative Regulations of Financial Institutions, Subcomm. on Domestic
Finance of House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Subcomm. Print
(1963).
[38] See, e.g., Cal. Fin. Code §§ 210-215 (West 1968&Supp. 1984); 111. Ann. Stat. ch. 17, §§
451-460 (Smith-Hurd 1981); N.Y. Banking Law §§ 10-14 (McKinney 1971 &Supp. 1984).
[39] Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982)).
[40] Ch. 240, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 134, (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)). The Bank
Holding Company Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982), regulates, among other things,
the acquisition and control of any national or state bank. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(a), 1841(c), 1842(a)
(1982). The Act applies both to acquisitions of existing banks and to de novo establishment of a
bank. In approving an acquisition, the FRB must consider the financial and managerial resources
and future prospects of the applicant and the bank, the convenience and needs of the community
to be served, and the effect on competition in the banking business. Id. § 1842(c) (1982).
[41] Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Edge
Act of 1919, ch. 18, 41 Stat. 378 (1919) (current version at 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-631 (1982)) entitled
the Federal Reserve Board to charter "Edge Act Corporations" which engage only in international
banking business. Edge Act corporations are beyond the scope of this article. See generally
McGuire, The Edge Act: Its Place in the Evolution of International Banking in the United States, 3
Law. Am. 427 (1971).
[42] First Bank of Logan, Utah v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 242, 261, reh'g denied,
385 U.S. 1032 (1961); First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
[431 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982). National banks must also get prior approval from the Comptroller
of the Currency. Id. § 36(e).
[441 See id.
[45] A bank holding company is any company that has control over a bank or a bank holding
company. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1982).
[46] 102 Cong. Rec. 6860 (1956) (statement of Sen. Douglas).
[47] 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (d) (1982). No state generally permits such an acquisition. See Ginsberg,
Interstate Banking, 9 Hofstra L. Rev. 1133, 1167-69&n. 169 (1981).
[48] See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982).
[49] Foreign banks that were not bank holding companies were free to establish, pursuant to
state law, branches in more than one state. International Banking Act of 1978, S. Rep. No. 1073,
95th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.&Ad. News 1427. These branches
were licensed and regulated by the individual states. See generally Note, The Regulation of Foreign
Banking in the United States After the International Banking Act of 1978, 65 Va. L. Rev. 993,
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999-1005 (1979). U.S. banks, in contrast, were prohibited by the McFadden Act from establishing
branches outside of their home states. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text. To remedy
this problem, the IBA requires selection of a "home" state for a foreign bank with offices in more
than one state. Foreign banks are therefore prohibited from interstate branching unless it is
permitted by state law. International Banking Act, § 5(c), 12 U.S.C. § 3103(c) (1982). Any bank
not selecting a home state will have a state selected for it by the Federal Reserve. Id.
[50] Prior to enactment of the IBA, only FDIC insured subsidiaries of foreign banks were
subject to federal oversight. Noninsured subsidiaries and branches were monitored solely by state
authorities.
[51] International Banking Act of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 910, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
[52] Section 4 grants the Comptroller primary examination, regulatory, and supervisory
authority over federal branches and agencies. S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 7 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.&Ad. News 1427.
[53] International Banking Act, § 4(a), 12 U.S.C. § 3102(a) (1982).
[541 Id. § 4(f), 12 U.S.C. § 3102(f) (1982).
[55] Id. § 4(b), 12 U.S.C. § 3102(b) (1982). A federal branch need not, however, join the
Federal Reserve System. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(b)(3) (1982).
[56] International Banking Act § 4(b)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 3102(b) (1982).
[57] Id. § 4(g), 12 U.S.C. § 3102(g) (1982). The minimum deposit required is the greater of (1)
the capital required of a national bank at the same location or (2) five percent of the branch's
liabilities. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(g)(2) (1982). The Comptroller may require the capital equivalency
deposit to be increased to conform with the accepted banking practices in the branch's area. 12
C.F.R. § 28.6 (1984). Although empowered to impose asset maintenance requirements, 12 U.S.C. §
3102(g)(4) (1982), the Comptroller has not done so. Apparently, the Comptroller is relying on
careful initial licensing and the capital equivalency requirement to preserve sound financial
conditions and protect depositors and creditors,
[58] International Banking Act § 6(b), 12 U.S.C. § 3104(b) (1982). The IBA limits the insurance
to those deposits payable in the United States to (a) an individual citizen or resident of the United
States, (b) a business entity organized under federal or state laws and having its principal place of
business in the United States, or (c) an individual or business that the FDIC determines to have
sufficient relationships in the United States. Id. § 6(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m)(2)(A) (1982).
[591 Id. § 6(a), 12 U.S.C. § 3109(a) (1982).
[60] The FDIC requires a foreign bank with an insured branch to pledge five percent of the
average of the branch's liabilities for the last 30 days of the most recent calendar quarter. 49 Fed.
Reg. 49,614, 49,620 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 346.19(b)). The pledged assets must be
deposited in an FDIC-approved depository institution. Id. In addition, the insured branch must
maintain a capital equivalency ledger account, a liability account computed on a daily basis and
equivalent to at least five percent of the branch's liabilities. Id. at 49,622 (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 346.20).
[61] Exposure of an insured branch to borrowers in the foreign parent bank's home country is
limited to 200% of the capital equivalency account, id. at 49,623 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
346.23); exposure to any other single country is limited to 100% of the capital equivalency account,
id.
[62] See S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong.&Ad. News 1432.
[63] International Banking Act § 7(a), 12 U.S.C. § 3105(a) (1982). Requirements for state
branches and agencies are set after consultation with state banking authorities. These requirements
have increased the reserve costs for foreign banks, which requires the banks to monitor and
manage their reserve positions more closely. See White, supra note 10, at 54.
[64] International Banking Act § 13, 12 U.S.C. § 3108 (1982).
[65] S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 13 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.&Ad.
News 1433. All banking offices are subject to examination by the Federal Reserve, which provides
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a federal supervisory umbrella over U.S. operations of foreign banks. A Federal Reserve examina-
tion will make as much use as possible of relevant reports by the Comptroller, the FDIC, and the
state authorities. Id.
[66] An alternative interpretation of the states' response sees the relaxation of state require-
ments as part of a "competition in laxity" as state and federal banking authorities seek to make
their bank charters more attractive to foreign banks. See, e.g., Address by FRB Chairman Burns,
American Bankers Convention, at 18-19 (Oct. 21, 1974), quoted in Scott, supra note 19, at 2.
[67] Liquid assets include currency and bonds, notes, debentures, bills of exchange, or other
obligations payable or guaranteed by a federal or state government. See, eg., N.Y. Banking Law §
202-b(2) (MeKinney 1971&Supp. 1984).
[68] These liabilities include, among others, current accounts, time deposits, letters of credit,
certified or bank checks, federal funds purchased, acceptances, borrowings, and accounts payable.
See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Dep't, Superintendent's Regulations, Part 323, § 323.1(c) (1977).
[69] N.Y. Banking Law § 202-b (McKinney 1971) (amended 1980); Cal. Fin. Code § 1756.1(b)
(West 1968) (repealed 1981); Il1. Ann. Stat., ch. 17, § 2720 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (amended
1982).
[70] N.Y. Banking Law § 202-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1983) (requires asset maintenance as
superintendent shall permit); Cal. Fin. Code § 1762(c) (West Supp. 1984) (foreign bank shall hold
assets as superintendent determines to be necessary for sound financial condition, protection of
creditors, and protection of public interest; in no such event shall amount exceed 108% of adjusted
liabilities); I11. Ann. Stat. ch. 17, § 2720 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (foreign bank shall hold assets as
Commissioner will permit in an amount which will bear such relationship to liabilities as the
Commissioner shall prescribe).
[71] 3 N.Y. C.R.R. § 52 (1983).
[721 See K-bler and Mundheim, Current Problems in International Banking: A Report on the
Kdnigstein Banking Symposium, 5 J. Comp. Bus.&Cap. Mkt. L. 233, 241 (1983).
[73] The Federal Reserve Board closely scrutinizes applications by foreign banks to acquire a
U.S. subsidiary. In addition to the usual factors, see supra note 40, the Board evaluates whether
the foreign bank is operating properly in its home regulatory environment. The foreign banking
authorities are contacted. If the acquirer is a group of individuals, they must submit financial
statements and other information sufficient to assess their ability to manage and support the U.S.
bank. Thus, obvious problems are avoided at the start. See Foreign Government and Foreign
Investor Control of U.S. Banks: Hearing Before Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary
Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 52 (1982) (statement of
Henry Wallich, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), reprinted in 68 Fed.
Res. Bull. 617 (1982). After the foreign bank acquires its subsidiary, the Board requires annual
reports from the foreign bank to ensure compliance with U.S. law and to monitor the parent's
financial condition. A reporting system monitors parent-subsidiary transactions on a quarterly
basis, and the parent must report any nonbanking activities commenced in the U.S. Id. These
preventative measures appear to be effective: in 1982 the Board reported to Congress that U.S.
subsidiaries of foreign banks had improved earnings and stronger equity ratios after acquisition
and that the business orientation of the subsidiaries had not changed materially. Id.
[74] The Federal Reserve Board's careful examination of foreign banks' applications, supra
note 73, includes an inquiry into the acquirer's willingness to infuse new capital into the subsidiary.
See id. (discussing capital infusions into Crocker National, Long Island Trust Co., and Financial
General Bankshares). If the parent were, for any reason, suddenly unable to support the
subsidiary, both banks could fail simultaneously.
[75] The discussion in this section applies whether or not the subsidiary is insured by the FDIC.
While deposit insurance will protect each individual depositor up to $100,000, trade and other
creditors will still have claims. In addition, because the FDIC is subrogated to the rights of the
insured depositors, the FDIC has an interest in recovering from the parent bank.
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[761 See K-ubler & Mundheim, supra note 72, at 241. Another approach, adopted by the Bank
of England, is to require comfort letters from the foreign parent. These letters imply, at a
minimum, a moral obligation to support the subsidiary. Id. Of course, the parent's guarantee of
the subsidiary's obligations may be worthless if the parent has troubles of its own.
[77] To reach this finding, three elements must be demonstrated: (1) control by the parent, (2)
wrongdoing by the parent through the subsidiary, and (3) unjust loss to the claimant. A prima facie
case would be made by showing that (1) the subsidiary was wholly owned and its directors did not
act independently, (2) the subsidiary was undercapitalized or the claimant was led to believe that
he was dealing with the parent, and (3) the claimant was injured by the subsidiary's insolvency.
See, e.g., Bernardin Inc. v. Midland Oil Corp., 520 F. 2d 771, 775 (5th Cir. 1975); see generally H.
Henn&J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 344-52 (1983).
[78] See e.g., H. Henn&J. Alexander, supra note 77, at 347-48&n.18 (citing cases).
[79] The Federal Reserve Board requires disclosure of parent-subsidiary dealings. See supra
note 73.
[80] To refer to the foreign bank's home office as the "parent" is, of course, incorrect because
the home office and the branch are one bank. The host's regulatory structure, however, often treats
the branch as a separate bank, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text, in order to protect
its banking system. This is the crux of the problem.
[81] The branch's failure is both legal, see infra note 84 and accompanying text, and, usually,
economic, cf. supra note 74.
[82] 12 U.S.C. § 3104(a) (1982).
[83] Every federal branch maintains a capital equivalency deposit with a member bank. See
supra note 57. This requirement is designed to further the goal of equal treatment for federal
branches; it does little to protect uninsured deposits in the event of liquidation of the branch.
[84] The Comptroller may revoke a federal branch's authority to operate if the Comptroller
believes that the foreign bank has not complied with 12 U.S.C. § 3102 or the regulations
promulgated thereunder, or if a conservator or liquidator is appointed for the foreign bank in its
home country. 12 U.S.C. § 3102(i) (1982).
[85] 12 U.S.C. § 31020)(1) (1982). Although a receiver is functionally equivalent to a trustee in
bankruptcy, a foreign bank engaged in the banking business in the United States is exempted from
liquidation under the U.S. bankruptcy laws, see 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(3) (1982), because the bank
regulatory scheme provides for liquidation of banking institutions. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 31 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong.&Ad. News 5787, 5817. Foreign banks not
engaged in banking in the United States, but with assets in the United States, are subject to U.S.
bankruptcy laws. Id.; cf. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd. v. FDIC, 536 F. 2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976)
(interpreting similar language in the old Bankruptcy Act) (British bank with assets in the United
States but not conducting banking activities there could avail itself of the bankruptcy law).
Operation of a bank branch anywhere in the United States is probably sufficient to satisfy the
"engaged in banking" test. Cf id at 513-14.
An argument may be made, however, that a bankruptcy court should be entitled to assert
jurisdiction in situations where the receiver of the foreign branch is not able to attach certain of the
foreign bank's assets. Such a situation would arise, for example, if the insolvent foreign bank had a
branch in New York and assets in other states that do not appear on the bank's books as
constituting part of the business of the New York branch. Under these circumstances, the receiver
of the New York branch would have no statutory authority to take title to these out-of-state assets.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text. Hence, unless a federal bankruptcy court asserted
jurisdiction, these assets would be available to the bank's receiver in the home country. In the
interests of protecting domestic creditors, and in view of the fact that there is no conflict with any
bank regulatory authority in the United States, the participation of a bankruptcy court in this
matter appears not to violate the Bankruptcy Code's policy of permitting banking authorities to
manage the liquidation of banks.
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